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Abstract. Corruption has fierce impacts on economic and societal development and is subject to 
a vast range of institutional, jurisdictional, societal, and economic conditions. It is this paper’s aim 
to provide a reassessment and a comprehensive state-of-the-art survey of existing literature on 
corruption and its causes and effects. A particularly strong focus is put on presenting and 
discussing insights resulting from empirical research and contrasting recent with older findings.  
Keywords. Bribery; Causes of corruption; Corruption; Effects of corruption; Survey  
 
1. Introduction  
Corruption has fierce impacts on economic and societal development and has permeated through 
entire portions of society and the economy. It is a complex social phenomenon and the motivations 
to engage in corrupt behavior are multifaceted and is the result of interactions at the micro-, meso-
, and macrolevel (Bicchieri and Ganegonda, 2016; Dimant and Schulte, 2016). Surprisingly, 
corruption has rarely been the focus of attention, but rather has been analyzed in a broader context 
of crime. Until the 1980s, corruption was mainly a topic of political, sociological, historical, and 
criminal law research and just recently came to the fore in the fields of economics. With the 
increasing quality and availability of data, empirical research on corruption has taken off since the 
late 1990s, whose insights help us to generate better targeted and more effective anticorruption 
policy measures (Lambsdorff and Schulze, 2015). Policy makers can only be best informed if both 
the extent of existing research is known and the generated insights are robust.  
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Following a number of influential and frequently cited surveys on the economic analysis 
of corruption published by, among others, Rose-Ackerman (1999), Tanzi (1998), Jain (2001), Aidt 
(2003), Lambsdorff (2006), Seldadyo and de Haan (2006), and Treisman (2007), it is this paper’s 
aim to provide a comprehensive, state-of-the-art overview of existing literature on and an ample 
discussion of the antecedents and effects of corruption. The strong focus on presenting and 
discussing recent empirical work on the antecedents and effects of current corruption research sets 
this paper apart. The comprehensive breakdown of both lines of research into a wide number of 
distinct categories is overdue and largely facilitated by the increasing amount of (more reliable) 
data on corruption. Hence, light is shed not only on recent developments on the role of corruption 
in areas that had already been discussed by previous literature (e.g., bureaucracy, economic 
development and income), but also on areas that lacked attention in previous studies (e.g., brain-
drain). A survey of this kind is particularly important in light of recent developments in terms of 
both data availability and quality. The purpose of this paper is to examine the existing literature 
surrounding the determinants and the effects of corruption. It is a systematic categorization of both 
determinants and effects of corruption as they have been discussed in empirical literature.1 We aim 
to discuss both the main theories that would imply the presence of a relationship, and also the 
relevant empirical evidence that has been previously published to assess this relationship. In 
particular, it seems that in the past decade, the literature has often found different empirical results 
to what had been published in earlier studies. We will, therefore, split up the evidence from before 
and after 2006 and examine whether the discrepancies arise due to the use of different data, or if 
the evidence is simply conflicting.2 An overview table that collects the empirical findings and 
indicates the causal direction with corruption follows each section. This systematic approach 
allows the interested reader to quickly grasp new developments in the empirical research on 
corruption and identify areas in which empirical research on corruption is still lacking. One result 
of this exercise is that the empirical results of older and more recent studies contradict each other. 
This contradiction can be attributed to a number of factors, such as different econometric 
approaches or more extensive data sets. We do not attempt to solve the debate but instead focus 
on reporting the empirical results and highlighting the differences in methodology. We structure 
this paper as follows: we discuss the empirical causes of corruption in Section 2 and the effects of 
corruption in Section 3. We conclude in Section 4. We present an overview of the empirical papers 
that are being discussed in the respective sections in tables 1 and 2, respectively.  
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2. Causes of Corruption  
2.1.1 Bureaucracy and Inefficient Administrative and Political Structure  
There are a few main theories that suggest that higher levels of inefficiency increase the levels of 
corruption. First, as pointed out by Tanzi, “the existence of regulations and authorizations gives a 
kind of monopoly power to the officials who must authorize or inspect the activity” (Tanzi, 1998). 
Thus, the more regulations there are, the higher the frequency of interactions with members in the 
private sphere, and thus, the higher the probability that a member will engage in corrupt practices. 
Tanzi also points out that in an inefficient bureaucracy, regulations tend to be less transparent 
(reducing accountability), and that authorizations tend to be given by specific individuals (reducing 
competition)—both these factors suggest higher levels of corruption. Kaufman and Wei also find 
empirical evidence to support this in their 1999 paper, predominantly using data from 1997. Later 
empirical evidence has continued to support this, it was found using different data that 
“government intervention in the economy, namely in the regulatory area, does promote corruption” 
(Goel and Nelson, 2010).  
 
2.1.2 Civil Participation/Press Freedom  
From a theoretic standpoint, it has been argued that the freedom of the press plays a role in the 
spread of anticorruption norms, as well as increasing the potential social cost of being publically 
shamed for corrupt behavior. Further, civil participation, in the form of democracy, can combat 
corruption, as regular elections give the public the option of removing corrupt politicians. Earlier 
empirical studies confirmed this hypothesis, stating that a long exposure to democracy predicted 
lower corruption (Treisman, 2000). Later studies concurred, using panel data covering 126 
countries from 1980 to 2007, that both democratization and media freedom have a negative effect 
on corruption (Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2015).  
 
2.1.3 Economic Freedom  
High levels of economic freedom, or the freedom to choose how to produce, sell, and use your 
own resources, should in theory be associated with lower levels of corruption. With fewer 
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economic controls, such as permit requirements, there is a lower chance that corrupt behavior is 
seen as necessary for engaging in business. This theory was supported by early empirical studies, 
which showed that increased economic freedom leads to lower corruption levels (Paldam, 2002). 
Later empirical studies also affirm this hypothesis; using data from the heritage foundation to 
measure economic freedom, it was found that there is a negative association between economic 
freedom and corruption (Saha et al., 2009).  
 
2.1.4 Economic Growth  
Arguably, corruption imposes distortionary effects on a country’s economic growth through its 
detrimental effects on the private sector, the quality of institutions, and the policy makers 
(Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2004). While the effects of corruption have been widely studied, there is 
less literature on the effects of economic growth on corruption. One early study that attempted to 
find a causal link between growth and corruption, and found that there was no such statistically 
significant relationship (however, it was also found that corruption decreased growth levels; Ali 
and Isse, 2003). Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) analyze the direct and indirect channels of the effect 
of corruption on economic growth. Their findings suggest that corruption slows down growth 
through its effect on investments and trade policies. More recently, a study that used data from the 
World Bank during the period 1970–2000 found evidence to support that growth reduces 
corruption in the presence of strong institutions, but has no effect when there are weak institutions 
(Aidt et al., 2008). A later study that used data from 13,000 firms between 2006 and 2010 in 
Vietnam found that higher levels of growth rates reduced corruption levels, in particular when 
there were strong land rights and cross-province activities (Bai et al., 2013).  
 
2.1.5 Ethnic Diversity  
In theory, a large ethnic division (proxied by ethnolinguistic fragmentation) will increase 
corruption triggered by in-group favoritism. In particular, if members of one ethnicity are elected 
to a public position, they are more likely to maintain that position even if they display corrupt 
behavior. This is because they are more likely to allocate resources favorably to members of their 
same ethnic group who will reciprocate by helping to keep them in office. An initial empirical 
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study that assessed a host of possible causes of corruption found that ethnic diversity had at best a 
weak effect on increasing the levels of corruption (Treisman, 2000). A later empirical study that 
assesses exclusively this relationship however finds that this hypothesis is confirmed when using 
US data from the justice department over the periods 1980–1989 and 1990–1999 (Dincer, 2008).  
 
2.1.6 Gender  
From a theoretical standpoint, it has been argued that women are less individually oriented (selfish) 
than men (Dollar et al., 2001). In his paper, Dollar points to various studies, which have shown 
that women tend to exhibit more “helping” behavior, vote based on social issues, and take stronger 
stances on ethical behavior. It would thus follow that women would be less likely to exhibit corrupt 
behavior. This has largely been shown to be true in empirical studies. One empirical study shows 
how parliaments with a greater representation of women tend to be less corrupt (Dollar et al., 
2001). This relationship was also found to be true in another empirical study that observed that 
government bureaucracies with larger female representation, and countries that have a larger share 
of women in their workforce, tend to be less corrupt (Swamy et al., 2001). Later studies performed 
empirical studies on the matter in laboratory settings to try and neutralize the effect of other factors, 
however women were still found to be less corrupt (Frank et al., 2011; Rivas, 2012).  
 
2.1.7 Globalization  
Theoretically it is believed that higher levels of globalization lead to reduced levels of corruption. 
As Charron points out growing interdependence amongst states, both politically through 
international organizations and socially through media should have an impact on spreading better 
quality of governments and anticorruption norms (Charron, 2009). Earlier empirical studies found 
this relationship to be true: in their study, Sandholtz and Koetzle found that the lower the degree 
of integration in the world economy, the higher the levels of corruption (Sandholtz and Koetzle, 
2000). Later studies have questioned this relationship for countries of low income, in a study that 
uses cross-sectional data for 127 countries from the year 2006, no linear relationship is found 
between corruption and globalization for poor countries (Lalountas et al., 2011). However, when 
using an unbalanced panel of 102 countries over the period 1995–2005, another study found that 
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globalization was in fact a significant variable in reducing corruption particularly for developing 
countries (Badinger and Nindl, 2014). Both studies found the relationship to hold for developed 
economies.  
 
2.1.8 Government Size  
One would expect that the larger the size of a government, the higher the levels of corruption. 
Typically, in larger governments, there is less individual accountability, more layers of 
bureaucracy, and more state intervention in the economy; all these factors would be expected to 
increase corruption. An early empirical study that used state-level data over the period 1983--1987 
found that government size, in particular spending by state governments, had a significant 
influence on increasing corruption (Goel and Nelson, 1998). However, a later paper that used data 
from transition countries from 1998 to 2002 found that in fact larger governments reduced the 
levels of corruption (Goel and Budak, 2006). Similarly, another empirical study that used data sets 
from 100 countries over the time periods 1995–1997, 1998–2000, and 2001–2003 found that larger 
governments in fact led to lower levels of corruption (Goel and Nelson, 2010). Another study that 
uses data for both OECD and developing countries over the period 1996–2003 however found 
there to be a strong causality between large governments and corruption (Arvate et al., 2010). In 
an attempt to explain these ambiguous results, a later study used annual data from 82 countries 
between 1995 and 1998 while controlling for the levels of democracy. It was found that size of 
government increases corruption when there are low levels of democracy and decreases corruption 
when there are high levels of democracy (Kotera et al., 2012).  
 
2.1.9 Governmental Structure  
Theoretically, decentralization should reduce corruption. This is because decentralized 
governments increase competition between regions, mitigates government-induced distortions, 
and give individuals the option of changing district rather than engaging in corrupt practices. An 
early empirical study gave credence to this theory, finding that fiscal decentralization in 
government expenditure is strongly and significantly associated with lower corruption (Fisman 
and Gatti, 2002). This was supported by a later study that found there to be a negative relationship 
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between decentralization and shadow economies and corruption (Dell’Anno and Teobaldelli, 
2015). Other studies have looked beyond the relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
corruption to examine the effects of physical and political decentralization. A recent study 
observed that in countries with a larger number of governmental tiers, levels of corruption were 
much higher. Additionally, larger subnational bureaucracies were found to be associated with 
greater corruption (Fan et al., 2009).  
 
2.1.10 Government System  
A democratic system should, in theory, produce lower levels of corruption. In a democracy, 
individuals must be re-elected, and it thus follows that if there are regular and fair elections, there 
should be a lower level of corruption due to this increased accountability. This relationship was 
found to be empirically true in a study that hypothesized corruption to be higher in countries with 
weaker democratic norms and institutions (Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000). This was supported by 
a later study that observed that exposure to medium-to long-term, uninterrupted democracy was 
associated with lower levels of corruption (Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2008).  
 
2.1.11 Historical Drivers  
Several theorists have noted the potential that different historical factors, including colonial 
histories, can play in determining levels of corruption in different countries. While few studies 
solely dedicated to the effects of colonialism have been published, an empirical study from 2000 
found that former British colonies had significantly lower levels of perceived corruption 
(Treisman, 2000). Such correlations were not consistent with the examination of former French, 
Portuguese, or Spanish colonies and conveyed a unique result with regard to Britain. These 
findings were reproduced by Swamy et al. (2001). A more recent empirical study has countered 
Treisman’s findings and argued that European settlement and colonization has a positive effect on 
corruption (Angeles and Neanidis, 2015). Angeles et al. assert that that where Europeans were able 
to settle in large numbers, they were abler to establish themselves as powerful elites, capable of 
acting corruptly with impunity. In a similar vein, some studies have noted that historical factors 
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such as religion, legal systems, and political stability also play a role in determining levels of 
corruption. These factors are elaborated on in subsequent sections.  
 
2.1.12 Legal System  
Theoretically, it has been argued that the kind of legal code in a country will affect the quality of 
the government, which in turn affects the level of corruption. An initial empirical study found that 
countries with common law had lower levels of corruption (Treisman, 2000). However, an 
empirical study that aimed to determine the effects of common law on corruption found no 
significant relationship after controlling for other factors (Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2008). A later 
study however found that using data from 100 countries in the time periods 1995–1997, 1998–
2000, and 2001–2003, common law is in fact correlated with lower levels of corruption (Goel and 
Nelson, 2010).  
 
2.1.13 Market and Political Competition  
Increasing market and political competition reduces the probability that an individual or small 
group of individuals will have a monopoly of a public good, thereby reducing the likelihood of 
corruption. An empirical study using data from both the early 1980s and late 1980s found evidence 
to support the hypothesis that political competition decreases corruption, though in a nonlinear 
way (a dictatorship is likely to be less corrupt than a partially democratized country), and 
inconclusive evidence regarding the effect of market competition (Montinola and Jackman, 2002). 
Later studies reached more nuanced conclusions, one study found evidence that greater political 
competition only reduced certain types of corruption (Sharafutdinova, 2010). Another study that 
looked at market competition using firm-level data to try to overcome difficulties from looking at 
cross-country data found that stronger product market competition is associated with an increase 
in the levels of corruption (Alexeev and Song, 2013). This finding was also supported in a different 
empirical study that also used data from exclusively one state (New York 2007–2010), and one 




2.1.14 Natural Resource Endowment  
Commonly referred to as a “resource curse,” many theorists have argued that having a high 
concentration of natural resources in a country may increase the frequency of corrupt behavior due 
to increased opportunity. An early empirical study found this relationship to be true, with higher 
levels of corruption in countries with higher abundances of natural resources (Sachs and Warner, 
1997; Leite and Weidmann, 1999). Later research using data from 1980–2004 across 124 countries 
confirms this finding, though it also finds that the extent of the effect depends on the quality of the 
democratic institutions present in that country (Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010). Interestingly, 
some theorists have contended that the type of resource effects the level of impact on corruption. 
A 2004 study indicated that a nonfuel raw resource endowment had the greatest effect on 
perpetrating corruption and limiting growth (Korhonen, 2004). Meanwhile, a 2005 study countered 
Korhonen’s findings and asserted that an abundance of fuel, ore, and mineral resources had the 
greatest effect on increasing corruption (Damania et al., 2005).  
 
2.1.15 Political Instability  
From a theoretical standpoint, two effects are worth noting. The first is the horizon effect, where 
if an individual has low stability his short-term decision-making horizon could increase the 
likelihood that he engages in corrupt behavior. On the other hand, some forms of corruption (e.g., 
infrastructure projects) require a large amount of time to complete, and thus only in extreme 
political stability (i.e., until the completion of the project) will there be a possibility for an 
incumbent and private sector to develop a corrupt relationship. The theory would thus suggest a 
U-shaped relationship between political stability and corruption. This theory was given some 
empirical support from an initial study that examined the role of political institutions and found 
that political stability is associated with lower corruption (Lederman et al., 2005). A later study, 
which exclusively examined the relationship between corruption indices and various measures of 
political stability, found that, after controlling for the level of democracy, there was in fact a strong 





2.1.16 Poverty  
From a theoretic standpoint, one would expect corruption to increase with the rate of poverty. First, 
poorer countries are less likely to be able to dedicate the necessary resources to building an 
effective legal system. Second, as Justesen and Bjornskov (2014) point out the main motivation 
for paying bribes in this case would be to obtain access to basic public services (such as education, 
water, permits, and licenses), which the government has a monopoly on, a strong motivation to 
break the law. This link was first hinted at in a paper that studied multiple causes and consequences 
of corruption (Mauro, 1998), and then later supported by empirical evidence in a multilevel 
regression in 18 countries that showed poor individuals are much more likely to experience having 
to pay bribes (Justesen and Bjornskov, 2014). 
 
2.1.17 Property Rights  
Lower levels of property rights are believed to increase the levels of corruption. This is because 
the lack of property rights constitutes a risk to individuals in the private sector, who are thus more 
likely to engage in corrupt behavior to mitigate or take advantage of such a risk. One of the initial 
studies that explored this relationship found that, following a general equilibrium model, less 
developed economies might opt for lower levels of property rights and higher levels of corruption 
(Acemoglu and Verdier, 1998). A later study provided more empirical evidence, finding that 
property rights protection contributes significantly to the reduction of corruption (Dong and 
Tongler, 2011).  
 
2.1.18 Religion 
 Theoretically, it is possible that religion would have an effect on the levels of corruption. As 
suggested by La Porta et al.(1999), religion can shape cultural attitudes toward social hierarchy 
and in particular whether or not one should question those in power. Further certain religions, such 
as Catholicism and Islam, are often intertwined with the state, and thus more likely to have an 
effect on levels of corruption. Initial empirical evidence for the argument finds that countries with 
a protestant background were associated with lower levels of corruption (Treisman, 2000). This 
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link was further supported by a paper which, after accounting for the effect of the economy, found 
that reformed Christianity (i.e., Anglican and Protestant) and tribal religions decreased levels of 
corruption, whereas Catholicism and Islam increased levels of corruption (Paldam, 2001). A later 
study that utilizes a 207-country sample finds that orthodox Christianity in a country in 1900 is 
associated with higher levels of corruption today, whereas Protestantism in 1900 is associated with 
lower levels of corruption today (North et al., 2013).  
 
2.1.19 Trade (Openness)  
Greater levels of openness and trade, or integration in the world economy should reduce the levels 
of corruption. That is because, as Sandholtz and Koetzle (2000) point out, greater integration could 
alter both the political–economic structure of the country and the cultural norms. In addition, 
increased levels of free trade would remove some administrative goods (such as licenses and 
permits) from bureaucratic monopolies, reducing the likelihood of corrupt behavior. This 
relationship received support from an empirical study, using data from 54 countries in 1996, that 
found both higher levels of state control in the economy and lower levels of integration in the 
increase corruption (Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000). This received further empirical support in 2006 
when a paper using data from 133 countries in 2003 found that both higher quality and higher 
levels of openness have a significant effect in reducing corruption (Gokcekus and Knorich, 2006). 
A later study provided even more evidence ¨ by finding that the relationship between corruption 
and GNP per capita is strongly negatively correlated only in open economies (no relationship 
otherwise). This was an extremely robust relationship across different time periods and different 
country samples (Neeman et al., 2008).  
 
2.1.20 Transparency  
Theory suggests that increased transparency should be associated with lower levels of corruption. 
With increased transparency, the probability of detecting wrongdoing increases, as does the 
accountability of each decision maker. This theory received some initial support by a paper that 
showed a strong association with possible causation between greater freedom of the press and 
lower levels of corruption based on data from 145 countries during the period 1972–1996 (Brunetti 
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and Weder, 2003). A later study that used data from the same source (Freedom House’s political 
rights index), but from 1972 to 2004 found evidence that transparency is not enough. Transparency 
is only significant when accompanied by free and fair elections, and the ability to impose sanctions 
on corrupt individuals (Lindstedt and Naurin, 2010). 2.1.21 Urbanization Meier and Holbook 
argued in 1992 that urbanization fosters the conditions necessary for corruption by loosening social 
controls of family and religion and by concentrating government programs and resources. The 
paper then goes on to provide empirical evidence that suggests strong positive correlations between 
urbanization and corruption using US data from 1986 to 1987 (Holbook and Meier, 1992). A later 
study by Goel and Nelson (2010) uses data from 100 countries and three time periods (1995--1997, 
1998–2000, and 2001–2003) and suggests that the opposite relationship is true, proposing that 
corrupt practices are easier to detect and stigmatize in urban population.  
 
2.1.22 Wages  
Theory suggests that public officials with a higher wage are less likely to engage in corrupt 
practices. Higher wages reduce the engagement in corruption due to need (supporting one’s 
family), however they are unlikely to completely eliminate it as individuals may still take bribes 
due to greed. This theory was given empirical support by a paper that found corruption to be 
negatively associated with wages across developing countries (Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 1997). 
A later paper that employed newly released data sets on low-income countries provided further 
evidence for an economically significant relationship between civil-service pay and corruption, 
although it was suggested that a very high increase in pay would be required to eradicate corruption 
(Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001). This theory received further support by a later study that also 
found that increasing government wages reduces corruption levels, based on an experimental game 







2.2 New Developments in Causes of Corruption  
2.2.1 Contagion Effects  
Many theorists argue that the propagation of corruption is contagious and that the level of 
corruption in a given country is largely dependent on the level of corruption in neighboring nations. 
An empirical study focused on the United States added merit to this theory and found that an 
increase in the levels of corruption in neighboring states of 10% led to increased levels of 
corruption in a state by 4%–11%, seemingly confirming the contagious nature of corruption (Goel 
and Nelson, 2007). Similarly, a 2008 multicountry study found that corruption can be viewed as a 
regional phenomenon and that any attempts at decreasing corruption in one nation will lead to 
decreased levels of corruption in neighboring countries (Becker et al., 2009).  
 
2.2.2 Economic Prosperity  
Intuitively, it would seem that richer countries would have lower levels of corruption. Less 
developed countries typically have weaker legal institutions, more inefficient governments, lower 
levels of education, and suboptimal government systems—all of which are associated with higher 
levels of corruption. This relationship was given some empirical backing in a paper that, using 
data from 62 countries over the period 1990–1998, found richer countries to have lower levels of 
corruption (Serra, 2006). A later study investigating the relationship between income inequality 
and corruption using data from 1980 to 2004 for 50 US states found that both in the short run and 
in the long run, there is bidirectional causality between income inequality and corruption (Apergis 
et al., 2010). A 2008 study instrumented the measure of income and corruption with 
biogeographical considerations to assert that while decreased corruption generally leads to higher 
levels of income in the short term, a long-term analysis shows that increased income is the driving 
cause of lower levels of corruption (Paldam and Gundlach, 2008).  
 
2.2.3 Education  
Theoretically, higher levels of education should reduce the levels of corruption in a country. 
Individuals with higher levels of education tend to be more committed to civil liberties and less 
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tolerant of government repression (Truex, 2011). Further, higher levels of education tend to lead 
to higher awareness of international standards, and thus in theory should reduce a person’s 
tolerance for corruption. Initial empirical studies found that higher levels of education are 
correlated with lower levels of corruption (Glaeser and Saks, 2006). In a later empirical study that 
analyzes this relationship using data from Nepal, this hypothesis is confirmed once again (Truex, 
2011).  
 
2.2.4 eGovernment  
Access to the internet and the existence of an eGovernment should in theory reduce corruption 
levels. eGovernment allows the transactions for permits or civil applications to be done online, 
thus increasing efficiency, transparency, and accountability, all of which inherently reduce 
corruption. A study found evidence to support the link between eGovernment and reduced 
corruption using a panel of 149 countries in two time observations, 1996 and 2006 (Andersen, 
2009). A later empirical study also reached the same conclusion and determined a unidirectional 
causality from eGovernment to reduced corruption (Elbahnasawy, 2013). 
  
2.2.5 Immigration  
As Dimant et al. (2015) point out, immigration from a highly corrupt country could have an effect 
on the levels of corruption. First, large-scale emigrations due to strong push factors do not only 
apply to a handful of honest citizens, but rather to the entire population, corrupt or not corrupt. In 
addition, if corruption is part of their cultural beliefs, this will emigrate with them. Further, it might 
take some time for individuals to fully adapt to their host country, and in this transitory period, 
they may be more prone to corrupt behavior due to greater need (Dimant et al., 2015). Recent 
empirical evidence based on data from 207 countries for the period 1984–2008 indicates that while 
immigration in general has no significant impact on corruption levels, immigration from highly 
corrupt countries indeed increases corruption in the destination country in the short run, with the 




2.2.6 Internet  
From a theoretic standpoint, it has been argued that the advent and increased use of the internet 
can led to decreased levels of corruption, as the internet enables the expedient dissemination of 
information regarding corrupt practices. A more aware and informed population is better able to 
report and counter corrupt actions. An empirical study from 2011 supported this theory and found 
that increased awareness of corruption via the internet, measured through corruption-related 
internet searches, correlated with decreased incidences of corruption in a number of countries 
(Goel et al., 2012). Similarly, a 2010 study found that the increased use and availability of the 
internet was correlated with lower levels of corruption (Andersen et al., 2011). There are few 












As a result, we find that, for the most part, empirical research has been active in addressing and 
replicating various topics concerned with the causes of corruption. With better availability of 
reliable data, future emphasis should be put on addressing the current findings within the research 
on new developments within the field. We will now turn to the literature on the effects of 
corruption. 
 
3. Effects of Corruption  
3.1.1 Bureaucratic Inefficiency 
 Corruption, in theory, should increase bureaucratic inefficiency. From a game theory perspective, 
those who are benefitting from the inefficient system by engaging in corrupt activities have no 
incentive to streamline the system. Thus, similarly to cultural values, corruption and bureaucratic 
inefficiency may be a viscous cycle. This theory received some initial empirical support in a paper 
found that firms that pay bribes are more likely to spend more management time with bureaucrats 
(Kaufman and Wei, 1999). The theory received further support after 2006 in a paper that finds the 
presence of corrupt officials can lead to bureaucratic delay in allocating licenses to productive 
individuals (Ahlin and Bose, 2007).  
 
3.1.2 Business and (Local) Investment Climate  
It has been argued that high levels of corruption will reduce a country’s growth levels by affecting 
the investment climate or investment quality. This can occur due to inefficient public investment—
even though investment levels may increase in absolute terms, the absolute productivity may be 
reduced due to inefficient allocation of funds. Corruption can also lead to lower levels of 
infrastructure, thus deteriorating the investment climate of a nation. Early empirical evidence to 
support both these hypotheses was found in a paper that uses data from 69 countries in the period 
1980–1983 (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1998). This was supported by a later study that also provided 
evidence to support the theory that corruption modifies the structure of public expenditure (De la 
Croix and Delavallade, 2009). A different study found that, using data from different districts in 
Liberia in 2010, corruption reduces the willingness to contribute to public goods, thus damaging 
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the local investment climate (Beekman et al., 2014). Reduction in investment quality was further 
evidenced in a paper, that using Italian public works data form the period 2000–2005, found higher 
levels of corruption resulted in less efficient infrastructure expenditure (Castro et al., 2014). 
Another study that used data from 80 municipalities in the Philippines also found that corruption 
affects the local investment climate via deteriorating the health outcomes of its population (Azfar 
and Gurgur, 2008).  
 
3.1.3 Civil and Political Rights  
Theoretically, corruption is believed to affect institutions in such a way that the protection and 
promotion of human rights is reduced, one would thus expect a negative relationship between the 
two. A paper, using cross country data, focusing on human rights and governance found that 
countries with higher levels of corruption have lower levels of political and civil liberties 
(Kaufmann, 2004). A later study that focused more specifically on corruption and human rights 
found that, using data from 186 countries for the period 1980–2004 and three measures of 
corruption, there was a positive relationship between corruption and human rights. However, not 
all the measures of corruption were statistically significant (Landman and Schudel, 2007).  
 
3.1.4 Economic Growth  
Theoretical arguments have been made for the effects of corruption on economic growth via lower 
levels of investment, lower quality of investment, higher levels of indirect taxation, and 
misallocation of resources due to distorted incentives. Large amounts of empirical studies have 
been published to support these theories. One paper provided evidence that there was a significant 
relationship between the allocation of talent to unproductive activities and corruption, as well as 
higher levels of indirect taxation and corruption, thereby reducing growth rates (Tanzi and 
Davoodi, 2001). A later paper that focused on the effects of corruption on economic growth in the 
United States found that states with higher levels of corruption had lower levels of economic 
development (Glaeser and Saks, 2006). A Later study that used data from 60 countries and 
accounted for a country’s level of economic freedom found slightly different results: their results 
indicate that corruption reduces (increases) economic growth in countries in which economic 
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freedom is low (high) (Swaleheen and Stansel, 2007). A later paper countered this study by 
suggesting that evidence for the “grease the wheel hypothesis” is very weak, and that there is a 
very strong negative correlation between wealth per capita and corruption, and that the effect of 
corruption on GDP per capita will lead to unsustainable development (Aidt, 2009).  
 
3.1.5 Foreign Direct Investment  
Attempting to invest in a foreign country often requires some form of public permit. In corrupt 
countries it is more likely that obtaining such a permit may require a form of bribe, thus increasing 
the cost of engaging in such activities and reducing the overall levels of FDI. In addition, some 
individuals or firms will simply choose not to engage in such corrupt practices and, thus, may 
simply avoid economic relations with such countries, again reducing levels of foreign direct 
investment in absolute terms. An empirical study that used data from the World Bank in 1997 
found evidence to support that higher levels of corruption were significantly associated with lower 
levels of investment, though this relationship was much weaker when the levels of corruption were 
considered to be very predictable (Campos et al., 1999). One popular exception for the relationship 
between corruption and FDI is the study by Egger and Winner (2005). They use data for a sample 
of 73 developed and less developed countries for the time period of 1995–1999. Their results 
support a clear positive relationship between corruption and FDI. More recent studies, however, 
support the negative impact of corruption on FDI. Exemplarily, a study used data from 20 OECD 
source countries and 52 host countries over the period 1996–2003. It was found that even though 
corruption reduced FDI overall, this was not the case if the country had previously received high 
levels of FDI (such as China), but especially the case if the country had low levels of FDI (such as 
Venezuela) (Barassi and Zhou, 2012). Other more recent studies confirmed this negative 
relationship (cf. Busse and Hefeker, 2007; Al-Sadig, 2009; Mathur and Singh, 2013).  
 
3.1.6 Income Inequality/ Poverty  
It has been argued that corruption increases income inequality and poverty by lowering growth 
levels, having a biased tax system, poor quality social programs, education inequality and asset 
ownership bias (Gupta et al., 2002). Gupta’s empirical study provides evidence that an increase in 
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corruption results in both higher inequality (measured using the Gini coefficient) and an increase 
in the percentage of poverty (Gupta et al., 2002). Gyimah-Brempong and de Camacho (2006) use 
panel data from 61 countries over a 20-year period investigating regional differences in the effect 
of corruption on income distribution. Their results suggest that corruption indeed breeds income 
inequality, with the largest effects being found in Latin American and African countries. However, 
more recent research is at odds with these findings, although mostly for Latin America in 
particular. Dobson and Ramlogan-Dobson (2010) and Andres and Ramlogan-Dobson (2011) find 
an inverse relationship of corruption and income inequality in Latin America, suggesting that 
institutional reform policies that are in place are misguided.  
 
3.1.7 International Trade  
In a similar manner to engaging in foreign direct investment, international trade most often requires 
some form of publically issued license or permit. In nations with higher levels of corruption, the 
costs associated with the acquisition of the necessary licenses and permits may be especially high 
due to the need to pay bribes etc. Thus, it is theorized that higher levels of corruption have a 
negative effect on levels of international trade. Oftentimes, the levels of corruption within 
institutions associated with trade have an impact on levels of trade. This assertion has been 
reinforced empirically by a study that found that the increased perceived uncertainty of a country’s 
institutions relevant to trade is negatively correlated with the level of international trade (Bugel, 
2010). An analysis of the relationship between corruption and ¨ trade in African nations, similarly 
found there to be a negative relationship between corruption and trade (Musila and Sigue, 2010). 
This is strengthened by another paper that found that corruption insecurity acts as a hidden tax on 
trade (Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002). Interestingly, some studies have looked at the effect of 
corruption, not only on the importing state but also on the exporting state. A 2011 study found that 
corruption generally has a more robust impact on the exporting country.  
 
3.1.8 Political Legitimacy  
From a theoretical standpoint it has been argued that for a political system to function, it must be 
considered legitimate, both nationally and internationally. A theoretical assessment by Bo 
22 
 
Rothstein and Jan Teorell asserts that people determine and value political legitimacy through lack 
of corruption, lack of discrimination, and the quality of governance (Rothstein, 2008). Thus, 
corruption undermines such legitimacy. An early study found empirical support for this theory; 
when using data from 16 mature economies, it was found that individuals residing in more corrupt 
economies expressed more negative reviews on the performance of their political system 
(Anderson and Tverdova, 2003). Another study found some evidence to support this theory using 
data from studies conducted by Vanderbilt University (Seligson, 2006). A different study, which 
sought to determine what makes a state legitimate, using data from 72 different countries, found 
that general governance was a highly significant element, of which corruption was a factor (Gilley, 
2006).  
 
3.1.9 Shadow Economy  
In theory, corruption can be viewed as a measure of taxation that might make it an economically 
rational decision for entrepreneurs to go underground. However, as Dreher and Schneider (2010) 
point out, one should differentiate between high- and low-income countries: countries with high 
incomes have a wealth of public goods (such as legal institutions) that may lead corruption to be a 
substitution to the shadow economy whereas in low-income countries the two may be 
compliments. A similar examination looks at the relationship between corruption and the shadow 
economy with regard to income to reveal that the shadow economy reduces corruption in high-
income countries, while increasing corruption in low-income states (Schneider and Buehn, 2009). 
An early study created a model that suggested that corruption and shadow markets are substitutes 
(Choi and Thum, 2005), this received support in a later paper that re-examined the relationship 
(Dreher et al., 2009). A later empirical study finds that, using cross-sectional data for 98 countries, 
there is in fact no robust relationship when perception-based indices are used. However, when 
using an index based on a structural model, shadow economies and corruption are compliments in 
countries with low incomes (Dreher and Schneider, 2010). More evidence was found in a later 
paper that focused on the effects of decentralization on both corruption and the shadow economy. 
This paper found a positive relationship between the two using data from a number of indices for 




3.2 New Developments in Effects of Corruption  
3.2.1 Brain Drain  
Higher levels of corruption could theoretically increase a country’s brain drain problems. 
Corruption is associated with a number of unfavorable outcomes, which might act as push factors 
to potential migrants. It has been argued that returns on education would be particularly affected 
(high levels of unemployment, lack of social advancement, slower economic growth etc.), thus 
those particularly sensitive to such a push factor (highly skilled individuals) would be more likely 
to emigrate due to this (Dimant et al., 2013). Few empirical studies were done prior to 2006, 
however this theory has received strong support in more recent years. Empirical evidence using 
data from 111 countries in the period 1985–2000 found that corruption was indeed particularly 
significant in fueling skilled emigration (Dimant et al., 2013). Further empirical evidence was 
provided from a paper that found that high levels of corruption effect emigration levels of skilled 
labor far more than unskilled labor using data from 20 OECD destination countries in the period 
1980–2010 and 115 origin countries in the period 1995–2010 (Cooray and Schneider, 2014). Even 
more empirical evidence was provided from a paper that, using data from 230 countries, found 
corruption to be a significant push factor in emigration (Poprawe, 2015).  
 
3.2.2 Fiscal Deficit  
Theoretically it has been argued that as corruption reduces public income (lower levels of growth, 
higher levels of inequality) and increases public expenditure (more inefficient spending), it thus 
follows that it will also increase fiscal deficits. Some initial empirical evidence to support this was 
found in a paper that showed that, after controlling for multiple variables, US states with higher 
levels of corruption have lower bond ratings, and thus taxpayers need to pay more to borrow, 
increasing the likelihood of fiscal deficit (Depken and Lafountain, 2006). A later paper provided 
further evidence that showed that corruption leads to deviations from the optimal public 
expenditure structure, reducing growth and thus public income (De la Croix and Delavallade, 
2009). More evidence is provided in a later study that, using data from Italian public works during 
the period 2000–2005, shows that public contracts execution is more inefficient in areas with 
higher corruption, thus increasing government expenditure (Castro et al., 2014).  
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3.2.3 Human Capital  
One would expect corruption to have a negative impact on human capital. Higher levels of 
corruption are associated with lower levels of education, health, socioeconomic development, and 
hence lower levels of human capital. Initial empirical evidence was found in support of this 
argument in a paper that, using a sample of 63 countries, found a statistically significant negative 
relationship between corruption indices and levels of human development (Akc¸ay, 2006). A later 
study that was based in the Philippines and focused on the effects of corruption on health also 
found that corruption negatively affected the health levels (Azfar and Gurgur, 2008). Our 
comprehensive review of the literature suggests that topics such as business and investment 
climate, FDI, income inequality have received considerable scholarly attention over the past 
decade, although often with conflicting results and thus demand further research. On the other 
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hand, other topics such as human capital, political legitimacy, and political rights, which are of 
particular importance at the present time, have been widely overlooked by recent research. A direct 
comparison with the breath of topics discussed in Section 2 indicates that the research on the effects 
of corruption needs to be substantiated in the future. We are hopeful that this survey triggers the 
interest within the relevant scholarly communities. We provide suggestions for future venues of 
research in our conclusion.  
 
4. Conclusion  
Thanks to the more convenient and better availability of data, empirical research on corruption has 
advanced vastly over the last decade. More sophisticated approaches now allow for a better 
understanding of the antecedents and effects of corruption, eventually explaining the disparity of 
the effects of corruption that are more detrimental in some countries rather than in others. These 
innovations have enabled this paper to survey newer developments with regard to both the causes 
and effects of corruption, which have not previously been measured empirically, such as the role 
of the internet and corruption’s effect on human capital. The greater part of the literature 
overviewed in this paper ultimately supports the idea that corruption is more likely to impede 
economic and societal prosperity.  
From a scholarly perspective, the challenge remains to deal with noisy data that try to 
capture behavior that is hidden from plain sight. The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the 
development of empirical corruption research and shed light on the (non) robustness of older 
empirical findings. While some of the more recent empirical research is in line with previous 
empirical findings, our examination also indicates that plenty of recent research has produced 
evidence that is in stark contrast to prior conventions. Exemplarily, recent empirical findings on 
the interrelation between corruption and bureaucracy, press and economic freedom, poverty, 
wages, or the shadow economy are in line with both theoretical assumptions and older empirical 
research. On the flipside, however, recent research has produced conflicting results on the 
interrelation of corruption with market and political competition, foreign direct investment, as well 
as income inequality and poverty. While one can only speculate about the exact reasons for such 
discrepancies, arguably more sophisticated econometric approaches and different and/or larger 
data sets are at least part of the story.  
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On the bright side, the constant progress in the research on corruption and the combination 
of different empirical approaches using both observational and experimental data, has given rise 
to the study of topics that had remained unexplored before. In particular, the research on the 
interrelation between corruption and gender, brain drain, and migration has benefited from this 
development.  
We still struggle to understand the multifaceted nature of corruption and its interactions on 
the micro, meso, and macrolevel (for a discussion, see Dimant and Schulte, 2016). Beyond doubt, 
the quality of empirical research on corruption is still advancing and has to settle important issues, 
such as the right way to measure corruption, before being able to both settle the debate of 
conflicting empirical findings and answer the plethora of still open questions (for an important 
discussion, see Goel and Nelson, 2011). One promising approach is the use of more objective 
microdata instead of using subjective perception-based data. A number of recent seminal studies 
have paved the way for a more reliable attempt to measure corruption (cf. Gorodnichenko and 
Peter, 2007; Ferraz and Finan, 2011; Chatterjee and Ray, 2012). Capitalizing on microdata to 
overcome the shortcomings of cross-country macrodata is most likely the future of empirical work 
on corruption. However, such microdata are usually hard to obtain, thus reducing the area of 
application of such an approach (cf. Heywood and Rose, 2014). It will be the respective 
government’s responsibility to be more transparent and provide the much needed data in order to 
facilitate future research.  
This paper’s exercise has been to convey a deeper understanding of the underlying issues 
and provide the status quo of the research on corruption. During the last decades, scholars helped 
a great deal to dissect causation from simple correlation, consequently allowing for more 
sophisticated and promising anticorruption measurements. Research on this topic and the 
implementation of an effective regulatory policy, suitable codes of conduct, political and 
bureaucratic transparency, and effective anticorruption measures can help to mitigate the 
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Notes  
1. In analyzing both the causes and effects of corruption, scholars point to the problem of 
endogeneity. “Interestingly, the same sets of antecedents used to explain corruption (i.e., 
economic, political-legal and socio-cultural) have also been used to evaluate the effects of 
corruption. This suggests that there may be feedback loops between antecedents and effects." In 
consequence, some of the corruption’s consequences discussed below can also be seen as a cause 
of corruption itself. Therefore, we mainly focus on well-published studies that made the effort to 
address potential endogeneity issues in order to extract the direct determinant or consequence of 
corruption.  
2. In this paper, we will mainly focus on empirical research using observational data. For an 
overview of research on corruption using an experimental approach, see Abbink and Serra (2012).  
3. Although the shadow economy has been included herein as an effect of corruption, the authors 
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